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Whistleblowers recover billions of dollars per year in fraud 
against the government under the Qui Tam act provision of 
the False Claims Act. The D. C. Circuit recently created a 
circuit split when it held that the Act's first-to-file bar should 
frequently prohibit a second whistleblower from bringing suit 
after a suit by an earlier whistleblower has been dismissed 
under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 
failing to plead fraud with particularity. The Third Circuit had 
previously held that suits dismissed under Rule 9(b) can never 
trigger the first-to-file bar. This article argues that the D.C. 
Circuit's position was undermined by Supreme Court's recent 
holdings on pleadings standards in Twombly and Iqbal and 
that the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the first-to-file bar is 
inconsistent with the anti-fraud purpose of the False Claims 
Act. The article also considers general arguments against 
"private attorneys general" provisions and concludes that the 
dangers are at a minimum in False Claims Acts cases because 
the government is acting as a market participant rather than 
in an enforcement role. The article concludes by arguing that 
Congressional action to further liberalize the first-to-file bar 
would significantly improve anti-fraud enforcement with 
minimal costs or unintended consequences. 
INTRODUCTION 
The False Claims Act has allowed whistleblowers to help the federal 
government recover over $24 billion from companies that defrauded 
the government since the Act was strengthened in 1986, including 
recovery of $3.4 billion in 2012 alone.1 False Claims Act litigation is now 
comparable in scale to antitrust and securities litigation.2 However, 
recent interpretations of the first-to-file bar in in the Act threaten to bar 
suits by whistleblowers with new and valuable information. Consider 
the following example, which is based on a simplified version of the 
facts in U.S. ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co.3 
' Law Clerk to the Honorable J. Travis Laster, Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery. J.D., New York University School of Law, 2014. I would like to thank the Honorable 
Robert A. Katzmann, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for 
his thoughtful suggestions about an earlier draft of this article. Any errors are my own. 
1 DEPARTMENT OF JusTICE' FRAUD STATISTICS - OvERvrnw, October 1, 1987-September 30, 2012, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf. 
2 David F. Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 
Colum. L. Rev. 1244, 1271 (2012). 
3 U.S. ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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Hurricane Katrina damaged or destroyed approximately 275,000 
homes and caused over $80 billion in damage.4 Fortunately, many of 
the hurricane victims had flood insurance, often guaranteed by the 
federal government through the National Flood Insurance Program. 
To ensure timely payments to hurricane victims, FEMA waived certain 
reporting requirements to clear the backlog of claims more quickly. 
Private insurance companies administering the federal flood insurance 
policies apparently saw these relaxed reporting requirements as an 
opportunity to defraud the federal government. They encouraged their 
appraisers to report wind damage, which was covered by the private 
insurance companies, as flood damage, which was covered by the 
federal government. 5 
The private insurers administering insurance claims under the 
National Flood Insurance Program retained Branch Consultants 
to perform damage estimates. Branch Consultants observed many 
instances of wind damage being attributed to flood damage in order 
to defraud the government into paying claims that were actually 
the responsibility of the private insurers. They decided to "blow 
the whistle" on the fraud by filing a Qui Tam action under the False 
Claims Act, suing on behalf of the federal government to recover the 
fraudulently paid sums.6 While the partners at Branch Consultants 
likely knew that filing this lawsuit would destroy their business with 
the insurance companies, subjecting them to some of the personal and 
financial difficulties typically faced by whistleblowers,7 they likely felt 
that the potential reward of receiving 15%-30% of any funds recovered 
for the federal government8 was worth the risk. 
After Branch Consultants' complaint was unsealed, the insurance 
companies realized that an earlier Qui Tam lawsuit alleging a similar 
type of fraud had already been filed by a whistleblower named 
Kerri Rigsby.9 Branch Consultants' complaint contained 57 specific 
examples of insurance companies overcharging for flood damage, 
complete with the homeowners' addresses and policy number plus 
4 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SERVICE AssESSMENT, HuRRICANE KATRINA, AuGusT 23-31, 2oos, available 
at http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/assessments/pdfs/Katrina.pdf. 
5 Branch Consultants, 560 F.3d at 374. 
6 Branch Consultants, 560 F.3d at 374. 
7 Paul Sullivan, The Price Whistle-Blowers Pay for Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2012, at Bl, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/your-money/for-whistle-blowers-consider-the-risks-
wealth-matters.html?pagewanted=all ("If you look at the field of whistle-blowers, you see a 
high degree of bankruptcies. You may find yourself unemployable. Home foreclosures, divorce, 
suicide and depression all go with this territory."). 
8 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (providing for a bounty to relator of 15%-25% in cases where the DOJ 
intervenes and 25%-30% in cases where the relator proceeds alone). 
9 Branch Consultants, 560 F.3d at 375. 
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the amount charged to the government and an estimate of the true 
damages in each case.10 The Rigsby complaint, in contrast, offered only 
general allegations of fraud, which are insufficient to meet the Rule 
9(b) standard for pleading fraud with particularity.11 Nevertheless, the 
insurance companies moved to dismiss Branch Consultants' complaint 
under the first-to-file bar in the False Claims Act, claiming that Branch 
Consultants' action could not proceed because Rigsby had already won 
the race to the courthouse, regardless of the quality of her complaint. 
The circuits are currently divided on the question of whether 
Branch Consultants' claim should be allowed to proceed or dismissed 
under the first-to-file bar. The Sixth Circuit, in Walburn v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 12 held that when the earlier suit cannot meet the pleadings 
standard under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which requires pleading fraud with particularity,13 the first-to-file 
bar does not apply.14 Under this rule, Branch Consultants' claim may 
proceed. However, the D.C. Circuit recently held in U.S. ex rel. Batiste 
v. SLM Corp.15 that the first-to-file bar should still apply as long as 
the earlier complaint provided "sufficient notice for the government 
to initiate an investigation into the allegedly fraudulent practices."16 
Under this rule, Branch Consultants' claim may not proceed. The rule 
for whether or not Branch Consultants' claim should be dismissed will 
have a significant impact on whether potential whistleblowers such as 
Branch Consultants will bring forward the detailed evidence needed 
to successfully prosecute fraud claims despite the significant personal 
costs involved in whistleblowing. 
How courts interpret the first-to-file bar is particularly significant 
because the first-to-file bar frequently impacts whistleblowers with 
information about fraud occurring on a national scale, where multiple 
parties are particularly likely to have information about different aspects 
of the fraud. For example, the relator in Batiste alleged that Sallie Mae, 
a company that manages over $100 billion in federal student loans,17 
10 Branch Consultants, 560 F.3d at 374-75. 
11 Branch Consultants, 560 F.3d at 376. 
12 Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966 (6th Cir. 2005). 
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). This standard has been uniformly into the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Walburn, 
431 F.3d at 972 ("Although not expressly required by the statutory language, we have previously 
held that a complaint alleging violations of the False Claims Act must allege the circumstances 
surrounding the fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b)."); Bly-Magee v. California, 236 
F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). 
14 Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972. 
15 U.S. ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
16 Batiste, 659 F .3d at 1210. 
17 REUTERS, PROFILE, SLM CORP., available at http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyPro 
file?symbol=SLM.O&rpc=66. 
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submitted false information to the United States to obtain additional 
payments on federally guaranteed student loans held by students 
throughout the country.18 Similarly, the relator in one health-care case 
alleged that a national manufacturer of medical devices paid kickbacks 
to physicians on purchases that were ultimately paid for by the federal 
government, 19 while a relator in another case of healthcare-related fraud 
alleged "performance of thousands of unnecessary invasive cardiac 
procedures [ ... ] for the purposes of fraudulently billing Medicare."20 
Where the first relator knows of the widespread fraud, but has 
insufficient evidence to meet the pleading standard under Rule 9(b ), 
it is especially common in large-scale frauds for another party to have 
more concrete details, as was the case in Branch Consultants. However, 
that second relator would be barred from bringing suit under the Batiste 
court's interpretation of the first-to-file bar. 
This Note considers the circuit split on the first-to-file bar from both 
a statutory interpretation and a policy perspective. Prior to turning to 
these issues, Part I provides a brief summary of the mechanics and 
history of the first-to-file bar as background to the following analysis. 
Part II contains a statutory interpretation analysis of the first-to-
file bar. This section begins with a textual analysis of the statute. This 
section then focuses on two questions. First, whether it is consistent 
for courts to read the Rule 9(b) requirement of pleading fraud with 
particularity into the pleadings standard of the False Claims Act for 
the first-filed complaint, but not read the same Rule 9(b) standard into 
the first-to-file bar. Second, whether the reasoning behind Batiste's 
interpretation of the /1 same facts" requirement in the text of first-to-file21 
bar as a notice-based standard22 has been undermined by the Supreme 
Court's reinterpretation of the notice-pleading standard in the text the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure23 with a facts-oriented plausibility 
standard in Twombly24 and Iqbal. 25 
18 Batiste, 659 F .3d at 1212. 
19 U.S. ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 508 (6th Cir. 2009) 
2° Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421F.3d817, 818 (9th Cir. 2005). 
21 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) ("When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other 
than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the 
pending action."). 
22 Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210 (holding that the first-to-file bar applies as long as the earlier complaint 
provided "sufficient notice for the government to initiate an investigation into the allegedly 
fraudulent practices"). 
23 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring only a "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief"). 
24 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
25 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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Part III contains a policy analysis of the first-to-file bar. This section 
first considers how different interpretations of the first-to-file bar 
serve the specific policy goals of the first-to-file bar in the False Claims 
Act. This section then situates relators as private attorneys general 
within the larger universe of private attorneys general under various 
different statutes and the common law. This section considers how the 
relatively private "market participation" context of the False Claims 
Act, compared to other roles played by private attorneys general in 
regulatory enforcement contexts, reduces the risks involved in allowing 
greater participation by private attorneys general in promoting the 
False Claims Act's general policy goal of efficient prevention and 
remediation of fraud. 
Part IV concludes by considering the implications of this policy 
analysis for potential future reforms of the False Claims Act. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
A. THE MECHANICS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
The False Claims Act is /1 one of the government's primary weapons 
to fight fraud against the government."26 The Act prohibits knowingly 
presenting a "false or fraudulent claim" to the federal government 
and provides for civil penalties and treble damages for violations. 27 
The government may bring a claim directly, but the Act also contains 
a "Qui Tam"28 provision, which allows a private individual, typically 
a whistleblower with insider information about the fraud, 29 to bring a 
claim on behalf of the government.30 The individual is called a "relator." 
When a relator brings a claim, they must file the complaint in camera. 
The complaint will remain under seal for at least 60 days and will not 
be served on the defendant during that period. The relator must also 
provide the government with /1 substantially all" of her evidence against 
the defendant so the government can decide whether to intervene and 
26 Letter from Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, to Representative 
Sensenbrenner, Representative Cannon, and Senator Grassley (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http:// 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06320r.pdf (attaching a GAO report on the False Claims Act). 
27 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(l)(G). 
28 A qui tam action is one "brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a 
penalty, part of which the government or some specified public institution will receive." Qui tam 
is short for "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur" which means "who 
as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter." QUI TAM ACTION, Black's Law Dictionary 
(9th ed. 2009). 
29 Approximately 75% of Qui Tam claims under the False Claims Act are brought by insiders. 
David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 
112 Colum. L. Rev. 1244, 1294 (2012). 
30 31 u.s.c. § 3730(b ). 
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take over the case.31 If the government elects to intervene in the case and 
assume primary responsibility for the litigation, the relator's share of 
the recovery is limited to 15%-25% of any recovery; if the government 
elects not the intervene and the relators conducts the litigation herself, 
she will receive 25%-30% of any recovery. 32 
B. THE HISTORY OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
The False Claims Act was originally passed in 1863 to combat 
rampant fraud among Civil War defense contractors,33 though the idea 
of combatting fraud through Qui Tam provisions dates back much 
further. 34 The Qui Tam provision of the False Claims Act serves a 
variety of policy goals. The Act's clearest purpose is to /1 enhance the 
Government's ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud 
against the Government,"35 but the Act also serves an important 
deterrent function by increasing the probability that individuals 
who defraud the government will be caught.36 However, another 
significant concern is allocating the costs of enforcement between 
direct government funding through the Department of Justice and the 
award of payments to relators. The Act was originally driven by the 
"necessity of ensuring enforcement ... with a minimum expenditure of 
resources from the already-stretched wartime government" during the 
Civil War. 37 
Legislators have also consistently been concerned with cabining the 
authority given to relators to avoid the costs associated with incentive 
mismatches between the relator and government. The original bill's 
sponsor went so far as to describe the Act as /1 setting a rogue to catch 
a rogue."38 These early efforts to limit the scope of relator's authority 
under the Act have continued with the addition of various provisions 
to the Act. In 1943, Congress removed jurisdiction for claims where the 
government already had knowledge of fraud in order to stop parasitic 
relators from bringing civil claims based purely on publicly available 
criminal indictments. 39 This provision was later expanded into a general 
31 31 u.s.c. § 3730(b)(2). 
32 31 u.s.c. § 3730(d). 
33 U.S. ex rel. Summers v. LHC Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 287, 291 (6th Cir. 2010). 
34 For a general discussion of historical acts containing qui tam provisions see Note, The History 
and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 Wash. U.L.Q. 81, 83 (1972). 
35 S. Rep. No. 345, S. REP. 99-345, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266. 
36 S. Rep. No. 345, S. REP. 99-345, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266 (recognizing that strengthening the 
qui tam provision was necessary in part because "[f]raud is perhaps so pervasive and, therefore, 
costly to the Government due to a lack of deterrence"). 
37 S. Rep. No. 345, S. REP. 99-345, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266. 
38 Summers, 623 F.3d at 291. 
39 Summers, 623 F.3d at 292. 
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public disclosure bar, which removed jurisdiction for any claim based 
on publicly available data unless the relator was an original source of 
the information prior to the disclosure.40 The provision that the relator 
must file under seal and provide the government with the evidence 
against the defendant was added to avoid tipping off defendants whom 
the government was already investigating and give the government 
time to decide whether to intervene and take over the case.41 The first-
to-file bar, which is the subject of this note, similarly seeks to balance 
the collateral costs of enforcement by individuals with the benefits of 
higher levels of anti-fraud enforcement and deterrence made possible 
by the increased investigation and litigation resources provided by 
relators acting as private attorneys general. 
II. INTERPRETING THE FrnsT-To-FILE BAR 
A. THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The process of interpreting the first-to-file bar must start with the 
text of the statute.42 The text of the first-to-file bar reads: "[w]hen a 
person brings an action under this subsection, no person other than the 
Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts 
underlying the pending action."43 Courts are split over whether there 
is sufficient ambiguity in the precise meaning of the phrases "related 
action" and "facts underlying" to consult the legislative history.44 
However, the legislative history provides little additional detail.45 The 
Senate Committee Report states that: 
"[This section] further clarifies that only the Government may 
intervene in a qui tam action. While there are few known instances 
40 31 U.S.C. § 3730(3)(4)(A) ("The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless 
opposed by the Government, if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the 
action or claim were publicly disclosed" in the news or in federal proceedings). 
41 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) ("The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for 
at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders" and "[a] copy 
of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the 
person possesses shall be served on the Government."); Summers, 623 F.3d at 292 (stating that "the 
under-seal requirement gave the Government the chance to determine whether it was already 
investigating the claims stated in the suit and then to consider whether it wished to intervene 
prior to the defendant's learning of the litigation") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
42 See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 
233 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[W]e may examine [the False Claims Act's] legislative history to determine its 
meaning only if the text of the statute is ambiguous."). 
43 31 u.s.c. § 3730(b)(5). 
44 Compare U.S. ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Section 
3730(b)(5)'s plain language refers to 'related' not 'Identical' actions. Therefore, we need not review 
the legislative history.") with Walburn, 431 F.3d at 970 (the legislative history "demonstrates 
repeated attempts by Congress to balance two competing policies."). See also, LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 
233 (considering legislative history in the alternative without relying on it). 
45 LaCourt, 149 F.3d at 233 (referring to "the statute's scant legislative history"). 
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of multiple parties intervening in past qui tam cases, United States 
v. Baker-Lockwood Manufacturing Co., 138 F.2d 48 (8th Cir.1943), the 
Committee wishes to clarify in the statute that private enforcement 
under the civil False Claims Act is not meant to produce class actions 
or multiple separate suits based on identical facts and circumstances."46 
While plaintiffs have argued that the "identical facts" language in the 
legislative history means that the first-to-file bar should be interpreted 
narrowly,47 courts have interpreted the first-to-file bar more broadly. 
There is general agreement that the addition of minor details in the later 
complaint does not defeat the first-to-file bar.48 Initially, courts applied 
the test of considering whether the later complaint alleges the same 
"essential facts" underlying the fraud.49 However, some courts have -
likely unintentionally - begun to blur the distinction between facts and 
allegations50 as discussed in more detail in Part II.C of this Note. 
B. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Two circuit courts have split on the issue of whether a complaint 
that fails to meet the standard under Rule 9(b) for pleading fraud with 
particularity may nevertheless bar later cases. In 2005, in Walburn v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., the Sixth Circuit held that a case dismissed under 
Rule 9(b) is never sufficient to trigger the first-to-file bar. 51 However, 
in 2011, in U.S. ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., the D.C. Circuit took the 
opposite view, holding that, for the first-to-file bar to apply, the earlier 
complaint "must provide only sufficient notice for the government to 
initiate an investigation into the allegedly fraudulent practices, should 
it choose to do so."52 
1. THE WALBURN CASE 
In Walburn, a security guard at a government-owned uranium 
enrichment plant claimed that Lockheed Martin, the private operator 
of the plant, had falsified reports on the level of radiation exposure of 
46 S.Rep. No. 99-345, at 25 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5290. 
47 See, e.g., LaCourt, 149 F.3d at 233. 
48 Multiple circuits have agreed that an action cannot escape the first-to-file bar by "incorporat[ing] 
somewhat different details." Walburn, 431 F.3d at 971 (quoting LaCourt, 149 F.3d at 232-33, 
Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1279 (10th Cir.2004); United States ex rel. 
Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214, 217-18 (D.C.Cir.2003), and Lujan, 243 
F.3d at 1189). 
49 Branch Consultants, 560 F.3d at 377 (circuits which have articulated a test "have uniformly asked 
whether the later-filed action alleges the same material or essential elements of fraud described in 
the pending action.") 
50 Branch Consultants itself did not make a clean distinction between allegations and facts. See 
discussion in Part II.C of this Note. 
51 Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973. 
52 Batiste, 659 F .3d at 1210. 
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its employees in order to maintain Department of Energy accreditation, 
which was contractually required in order for Lockheed Martin to 
continue to receive payments from the government. 53 However, an 
earlier relator had filed a complaint containing broad allegations of 
fraud, claiming that "Lockheed 'falsified, concealed and destroyed 
documentation' relating to 'plant management and operations' and 
knowingly submitted these 'false records and statements' to the 
government."54 The district court concluded that Walburn's specific 
claim was "encompassed" by the earlier broad allegations and 
dismissed his suit under the first-to-file bar.55 
The Sixth Circuit, however, found that the first-to-file bar did 
not apply because a suit that has been dismissed for failing to plead 
fraud with particularity inherently cannot trigger the first-to-file bar. 
The court reasoned that a later action /1 cannot be 'based on the facts 
underlying' the [earlier] action when the facts necessary to put the 
government on notice of the fraud alleged are conspicuously absent 
from" the earlier complaint given that the earlier complaint failed to 
meet the particularity standard under Rule 9(b ). 56 The court noted that 
any later allegation of fraud regarding the operation of the Lockheed 
Martin facility would have been encompassed in the vague allegations 
of the earlier complaint, so a broad interpretation of the first-to-file 
bar would not serve either the goal of preventing parasitic suits or 
encouraging whistleblowers to bring forward useful information. 57 
2. THE BATISTE CASE 
In Batiste, an employee of Sallie Mae (a company that manages 
over $100 billion in federal student loans58), brought a Qui Tam action 
claiming that Sallie Mae had defrauded the government by using 
unlawful methods to put additional loans into forbearance, triggering 
additional payments to Sallie Mae from the Department of Education 
that increased Sallie Mae's return on each loan. 59 Batiste claimed 
personal knowledge of managers instructing employees to violate 
federal regulations on forbearance procedures and an incentive system 
53 Walburn, 431 F.3d at 969. 
54 Id. at 971. 
55 Id. at 972. 
56 Id. at 973. 
57 See Id. ("[W]e fail to see how according preemptive effect to a fatally-broad complaint furthers 
the policy of encouraging whistleblowers to notify the government of potential frauds.") and Id. 
at 970 (The first-to-file bar "seek[ s] to discourage opportunistic plaintiffs from bringing parasitic 
lawsuits whereby would-be relators merely feed off a previous disclosure of fraud."). 
58 REUTERS, PROFILE, SLM CORP., available at http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyPro 
file?symbol=SLM.O&rpc=66. 
59 Batiste, 659 F .3d at 1206. 
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that encouraged such violations in his New Jersey office of Sallie Mae.60 
A complaint by an earlier relator had alleged that employees in the 
Nevada office of Sallie Mae had defrauded the government by falsely 
claiming that borrowers had orally agreed to enter forbearance. 61 The 
earlier complaint was dismissed for failure to obtain counsel by a 
deadline imposed by the court.62 The district court dismissed Batiste's 
suit under the first-to-file bar. 63 
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal under the 
first-to-file bar after interpreting the first-to-file bar to apply when the 
earlier complaint provides "sufficient notice for the government to 
initiate an investigation into the allegedly fraudulent practices, should 
it choose to do so."64 The court specifically rejected Batiste's argument, 
supported by the United States as amicus curiae, that it should adopt 
the standard articulated in Walburn. 65 The court based its decision in 
part on the fact that the Rule 9(b) standard is not mentioned in the 
text of the first-to-file bar, but did not address the fact that the court 
had previously read Rule 9(b) into other portions of the Act without 
requiring an explicit reference in the text. 66 The court did not fully explain 
how its notice-based standard is grounded in the text of the first-to-file 
bar, though the court did cite a district court case for the proposition 
that "an examination of possible recovery ... aids in the determination 
of whether the later-filed complaint alleges a different type of 
wrongdoing on new and different material facts" and found that "the 
Batiste Complaint alleges a fraudulent scheme the government already 
would be equipped to investigate based on the [earlier] complaint."67 
The court also found the Walburn standard unnecessary to deter over-
broad pleading by the earlier relator68 and expressed concern that the 
Walburn standard would create a "strange judicial dynamic, potentially 
requiring one district court to determine the sufficiency of a complaint 
filed in another district court, and possibly creating a situation in which 
the two district courts disagree on a complaint's sufficiency."69 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1207. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1210. 
6s Id. 
66 See Id. at 1216. 
67 See Id. at 1209-10. 
68 Id. at 1210. 
69 Id. 
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c. IMPACT OF PLEADING STANDARDS ON INTERPRETATION 
OF THE FIRST-TO-FILE BAR 
1. THE REQUIREMENT TO PLEAD FRAUD WITH PARTICULARITY 
UNDER RULE 9(B) SHOULD BE READ INTO THE 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT IN A UNIFORM MANNER 
The fact that courts have uniformly read a Rule 9(b) requirement 
into the pleadings standard of the False Claims Act by courts supports 
the proposition that the Rule 9(b) requirement may also need to be read 
into the first-to-file bar in the Act as well for consistency. The False 
Claims Act prohibits knowingly presenting claims that are merely 
"false" (in addition to claims that are "fraudulent") to the federal 
government. 70 Nevertheless, the courts to consider the issue agree that 
"it is self-evident that the [False Claims Act] is an anti-fraud statute,"71 
so "complaints brought under the False Claims Act must fulfill the 
requirements of Rule 9(b )" because /1 defendants accused of defrauding 
the federal government have the same protections as defendants sued 
for fraud in other contexts."72 
The first-to-file bar should similarly be read in light of the Act's 
anti-fraud purpose. The heightened pleading standard in required 
under Rule 9(b) is required because /1 fraud encompasses a wide variety 
of activities," so more specific information is required to understand 
a claim of fraud. 73 Therefore, as held in Walburn, /1 a complaint that 
fails to provide adequate notice to a defendant can hardly be said to 
have given the government notice of the essential facts of a fraudulent 
scheme, and therefore would not enable the government to uncover 
related frauds." 74 Courts should at least analyze whether the same 
considerations that require reading the Rule 9(b) standard into the 
pleadings standard for each complaint might also require reading the 
Rule 9(b) standard into the comparison of complaints in the first-to-file 
bar to remain consistent. 
2. THE HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARD ARTICULATED IN 
TWOMBLY AND IQBAL UNDERMINED PRECEDENT USED IN BATISTE 
Many courts interpreting the first-to-file bar have articulated tests that 
blur the line between facts and allegations in the relevant complaints. The 
70 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(l) (using the disjunctive "or" in imposing liability for a "false or fraudulent 
claim"). 
71 Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1213. 
72 Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2001). 
73 United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
74 Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973. 
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D.C. Circuit's decision in Batiste relied on this line of cases that blurred 
the line between facts and allegations in the context of the first-to-file bar. 
After the Supreme Court's articulation of a fact-oriented plausibility-
based pleading standard in Twombly and Iqbal, courts must make careful 
distinctions between facts and allegations. Therefore, the entire line of 
precedent leading up to Batiste must be reconsidered. 
This lack of distinction between facts and allegations began with 
the first circuit court to interpret the first-to-file bar, the Third Circuit 
in U.S. ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc.75 
The court used the words "facts" and "allegations" interchangeably in 
stating its test for whether the first-to-file bar was triggered. The court 
first stated that the first-to-file bar is triggered when" a later allegation 
states all the essential facts of a previously-filed claim" and then later 
rephrased the same test as when a later complaint "alleg[es] the same 
elements of a fraud described in an earlier suit"76 (emphasis mine). This 
phrasing, using "facts" and "allegations" interchangeably, implies that 
the court believed that facts and allegations should be treated identically 
for purposes of interpreting the first-to-file bar. The court apparently 
found this proposition so intuitive that it provided no explanation for 
using the terms "facts" and "allegations" interchangeably. 
The second court to address the distinction between facts and 
allegations made its reasoning more explicit. The Ninth Circuit, in 
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., stated that: 
Plaintiff also contends that the district court impermissibly 
equated facts with allegations, and that [the first-to-file bar] 
requires an analysis of Lujan and Schumer's facts, not their 
allegations. We reject this contention. In motions to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b )(1 ), 
the reviewing court must accept as true the allegations of 
the complaint. See Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1157 n. 
1 (9th Cir.2001). For purposes of this inquiry, there is no 
difference between allegations and the underlying facts. 77 
The Lujan court thus explicitly relied on the then-current notice 
pleading standard to equate allegations and facts for the purposes of 
the first-to-file bar. 
75 Lacorte, 149 F .3d 227. The court in Lujan later stated that the Third Circuit in LaCorte was at that 
time "the only appellate court to discuss and apply§ 3730(b)(5) [the first-to-file bar]." Lujan, 243 
F.3d at 1189. 
76 Lacorte, 149 F .3d at 232-33. 
77 Lujan, 243 F.3d at 1189. 
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The D.C. Circuit adopted the equivalence between allegations and 
facts expressed in Lujan in the 2003 case U.S. ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/ 
HCA Healthcare Corp.78 The D.C. Circuit then relied upon Hampton in its 
interpretation in Batiste that the first-to-file bar applies when the later 
complaint "alleges the same material elements of fraud" which "suffices 
to put the U.S. government on notice of allegedly fraudulent" activity.79 
Since the Lujan court relied on a proposition that has been 
dramatically altered by the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, 80 the entire 
line of precedent leading from Lujan to Batiste is infirm and must be 
reconsidered. While there is still active debate over the precise meaning 
of Twombly and Iqbal,81 it is "hard to see how a plaintiff could satisfy" 
the plausibility standard "without some factual allegation in the 
complaint," as the Supreme Court itself stated in Twombly. 82 Therefore, 
the new standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal certainly does not 
allow the complete interchangeability of facts and allegations originally 
relied upon in Lujan, and subsequently in Hampton and Batiste. 
Moreover, even under the previous notice pleadings standard, the 
contention that facts and allegations may be treated as equivalent for 
purposes of the first-to-file bar requires scrutiny. The first-to-file bar 
applies to a "related action based on the facts underlying the pending 
action."83 The pending action refers to the earlier-filed complaint, not 
the complaint in the current case. There was no rule under the original 
notice pleading standard that courts must consider the allegations 
in other complaints as true. Congress' particular choice to refer to 
"underlying facts" rather than allegations should not have been so 
lightly ignored. 
78 U.S. ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
79 Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1209. 
80 Although Twombly and Iqbal considered 12(b)(6) motions for failure to state a claim and courts 
have applied the first-to-file bar after 12(b )(1) motions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
Twombly and Iqbal still apply here because the first-to-file is likely actually properly considered 
under 12(b)(6) per the Court's recent holding in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), that 
such restrictions go the merits rather than jurisdiction. Further, several courts have applied the 
Twombly and Iqbal standard to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 
88 (2d Cir. 2009) and Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1052 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd in 
part on other grounds en bane, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010). However, one observer has criticized 
these decisions as the product of "cut and paste precedent" where the reason for the extension 
was not articulated by the courts. Jacob Taber, Note, Silly Jurist, Twiqbal's for Claims, [unpublished 
manuscript forthcoming in the NYU Law Review; citation to be revised]. 
81 As the Tenth Circuit recently stated, it is unclear "whether this new standard requires minimal 
change or whether it in fact requires a significantly heightened fact-pleading standard." Khalik v. 
United Air Lines, 671F.3d1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012). 
82 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n. 3. 
83 31 u.s.c. § 3730(b)(5). 
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3. THE DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF FACTS IN THE PLEADING 
STANDARDS IN BATISTE COMPARED TO TWOMBLY AND 
IQBAL PRESENTS A CASE OF JuDICIAL SCHIZOPHRENIA 
83 
Although the first-to-file bar is not a pleading standard, so its 
interpretation not strictly controlled by Twombly and Iqbal, it is hard to 
reconcile the judicial philosophy behind Twombly and Iqbal with a notice-
based interpretation of the first-to-file bar. Twombly and Iqbal demonstrate 
a trend away from a notice standard in reading complaints toward 
a fact-based standard84 despite the absence of the term "facts" in Rule 
S(a).85 The D.C. Circuit in Batiste, however, has reinterpreted a statute 
containing the phrase "underlying facts" into a notice-based standard. 86 
These judicial crosscurrents are hard to reconcile. The only consistent 
element between them is the unfortunate appearance that the plaintiff 
always loses. The argument that Batiste does benefit the plaintiff who 
filed the earlier claim is unavailing since that plaintiff, whose claim could 
not survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b ), is already unlikely to 
recover any award.87 Reconsideration of the notice standard in Batiste 
would help establish a more coherent judicial philosophy. 
III. POLICY GoALS OF THE FIRST-To-FILE BAR 
A. THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
FIRST-TO-FILE BAR ON ITs SPECIFIC POLICY GoALS 
The first-to-file bar serves a variety of goals that sometimes conflict 
with each other. This section identifies the various goals of the first-
to-file bar and how they interrelate, then considers how different 
interpretations of the first-to-file bar would affect the attainment of 
these specific goals. 
As a preliminary matter, reducing the number of potentially 
duplicative claims is not an end-goal of the first-to-file bar. Some courts 
do refer to reducing the number of potentially duplicative claims as a 
goal of the first-to-file bar, butthemoreinformativeview is that reducing 
the number of potentially duplicative claims is an intermediate step 
toward another end goal such as conserving judicial resources. 
84 See Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1191 (discussing varying views on Twombly and Iqbal and noting that all 
involve at least some movement toward requiring facts). 
85 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring a "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief"). 
86 Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1209. 
87 The mere fact that the United States has declined to intervene reduces the likelihood of a 
recovery from 90% to 10%, see Engstrom, supra note 2, at n. 24, and the court's dismissal doubtless 
further reduces the probability of any recovery. 
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The goals of the first-to-file bar consist of: maximizing the incentives 
for relators to bring claims and expose fraud by avoiding dilution of 
the claims of meritorious relators, encouraging relators to bring claims 
quickly through the threat of another relator winning the "race to the 
courthouse," avoiding unnecessary payments to relators where the 
government is equipped to bring claims itself, avoiding unnecessary 
burdens on defendants, and judicial efficiency. Allowing cases that 
have been dismissed under Rule 9(b) to trigger the first-to-file bar does 
not materially advance any of these policy goals. 
First, Batiste's interpretation of the first-to-file bar does not materially 
help avoid dilution of the award to the first relator, and can reduce 
incentives for relators to bring forward information they posses about 
frauds against the government. A goal of the first-to-file bar is avoiding 
diluting the potential award to the first relator by allowing subsequent 
relators to "poach" related claims that the first relator would eventually 
have discovered and added to the original suit.88 However, when the 
first claim has proven legally infirm, there is no longer any risk to 
diluting that claim. The goal of rewarding plaintiffs who can effectively 
pursue frauds against the government is better served by providing 
an incentive for a new relator with additional valuable information 
to come forward, rather than destroying the that incentive entirely by 
barring additional claims. 
Interpreting the first-to-file bar not to apply after a Rule 9(b) 
dismissal also reduces incentives for plaintiffs to file bare bones or 
haphazard claims in an effort to file first, thus maximizing the reward 
for meritorious relators. During Congressional reconsideration of the 
Act, the Attorney General's office expressed concern that the first-to-
file bar encourages some plaintiffs' attorneys to focus on quantity over 
quality in filings, and that many of these plaintiff's attorneys do not 
meaningfully contribute to the litigation, but are content "to sit back 
and pick up their check at the end."89 Judge Posner has even expressed 
concern that a strict interpretation of the first-to-file bar could result 
in a "market" for first-filed claims, where relators who have made 
many bare-bones claims wait for a relator with useful information who 
is actually willing to pursue the case, and then allow that relator to 
88 Congress' amendments to the Act in 1943 were specifically intended, in part, to curtail 
"parasitic" lawsuits. See Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for Less: The Department of 
Justice's Command Performance Under the 1986 False Claims Amendments Act, 7 Admin. L. Rev. 
Am. U. 409, 415 (1993); S. REP. NO. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986) (discussing prior amendment 
to the False Claims Act). 
89 See False Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & 
Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong. 21 (1990) (statement of 
Stuart Gerson, Assistant Att'y Gen. of the United States). 
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make use of the first-filed suit for a fee. 90 Payments in such a claims 
market would obviously reduce the incentives of relators with useful 
information to come forward. Therefore, interpreting the first-to-file 
bar not to apply after dismissal of an earlier complaint under Rule 
9(b) would actually maintain or increase the potential rewards for 
relators with valuable information, contrary to worries about dilution 
of rewards for meritorious relators. 
Second, a significant incentive to file quickly exists under either 
interpretation of the first-to-file bar, so allowing cases that have 
been dismissed under Rule 9(b) to trigger the first-to-file bar is not 
necessary to advance this policy goal. Preserving the incentive to file 
quickly is necessary because the government has a significant interest 
in encouraging relators to bring forward information about fraud as 
quickly as possible to prevent additional losses. For example, in one 
case, the government opposed an award to a relator because the relator 
allegedly waited to let additional damages accrue before reporting the 
fraud, costing the government an additional $27 million. 91 However, 
even if the first-to-file bar is interpreted not to apply to suits dismissed 
under Rule 9(b ), an earlier relator still has two significant incentives 
to file as soon as possible. First, another relator may well be able to 
meet the requirements of Rule 9(b ), triggering the first-to-file bar under 
either interpretation. Second, filing suit informs the United States about 
the fraud. If the fraud claim is significant and credible, the government 
will likely choose to intervene. Even if the first relator was unable to 
provide sufficient evidence to meet the Rule 9(b) standard on her own, 
the government may be able to investigate and uncover additional 
information. If the government ultimately wins, the first relator will 
still receive a share of the proceeds. Therefore, this interpretation of the 
first-to-file bar does not materially dilute the incentive to file quickly. 
Third, interpreting the first-to-file bar not to apply after dismissal 
under Rule 9(b) will only result in additional payments to a future 
relator in a case where the government chose not to intervene or lost in 
the earlier case, minimizing the risk of "unnecessary" payments. The 
court in Batiste justified its decision that the first-to-file bar should apply 
even after Rule 9(b) dismissals in part on the grounds that government 
90 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 
1, 34 (1975). 
91 Amal Kumar Naj, General Electric Pleads Guilty, Pays $69 Million to Settle Whistle-Blower Suit, 
Wall St. J., July 23, 1992, at A2. See also Ben Depoorter & Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An Economic 
Analysis of the False Claims Act, 14 Supreme Ct. Econ. Rev. 135 (2006) (claiming that the structure 
of the FCA does not provide sufficient incentives for relators to halt fraud at the socially optimal 
time). 
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may still be put sufficiently on notice to investigate the fraud itself.92 
However, if the government has not intervened in the earlier case, it 
implies that the fraud is not viewed as a high priority by the government 
or that the government is not in fact on notice of a significant fraud. If 
the government did intervene, then the dismissal makes it apparent 
that government did not have sufficient evidence available. In either 
case, a subsequent relator who is able to provide sufficient additional 
information to meet the Rule 9(b) pleading standard appears to be 
providing some value. The public disclosure bar already ensures that 
the new relator must bring valuable additional information, since the 
prior federal suit would qualify as a public disclosure, so mere re-filing 
of the same complaint is already barred.93 Characterizing payments to a 
relator in that situation as "unnecessary" will frequently be inaccurate. 
Fourth, the goal of avoiding unnecessary burdens on innocent 
defendants depends heavily on determining when a lawsuit is likely 
frivolous. Current complaints about haphazard filing of Qui Tam 
actions concern the filing of suits about new instances of alleged fraud, 
not instances of repeated filings regarding the same alleged fraud. 94 
There is limited utility in addressing a problem - re-filing of essentially 
identical actions - that currently does not seem to exist. If a set of 
connected relators or attorneys actually filed the same suit repeatedly 
purely for the purpose of coercing a settlement, sanctions would likely 
be available to address such an abuse. Therefore, there is no evidence 
that an alternative interpretation of the first-to-file bar would reduce 
unnecessary burdens on defendants. 
Fifth, judicial efficiency in the sense of merely choosing the 
interpretation of the first-to-file bar resulting in the fewest lawsuits may 
be a false economy. The better question is whether the expenditure of 
additional judicial resources to reduce fraud against the government 
is superior to available alternatives to reduce fraud. This question is 
addressed in the following section, which considers the general case 
for private attorneys general in the context of the first-to-file bar. 
Judicial efficiency in the sense of creating clear rules for courts to 
apply is also better served by interpreting the first-to-file bar not to 
apply after a Rule 9(b) dismissal of an earlier suit. The court in Batiste 
did express concern that allowing a later-filed complaint to proceed 
92 Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210 (stating that "a complaint may provide the government sufficient 
information to launch an investigation of a fraudulent scheme even if the complaint does not 
meet the particularity standards of Rule 9(b )"). 
93 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
94 See, e.g., Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for Less: The Department of Justice's Command 
Performance Under the 1986 False Claims Amendments Act, 7 Admin. L. Rev. Am. U. 409, 452 (1993). 
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where the earlier complaint failed to satisfy Rule 9(b) would /1 create 
a strange judicial dynamic, potentially requiring one district court to 
determine the sufficiency of a complaint filed in another district court, 
and possibly creating a situation in which the two district courts disagree 
on a complaint's sufficiency."95 However, this dynamic is inherently 
present in the False Claims Act. Under the first-to-file bar, multiple 
courts will have to determine what Congress meant by /1 a related action 
based on the facts underlying the pending action" 96 regardless of the 
particular interpretation of that phrase. Under the interpretation in 
Batiste, a second court will still be required to determine if a complaint 
in another court "provided the government sufficient information to 
launch an investigation of a fraudulent scheme,"97 which could equally 
place the two district courts into conflict if the earlier-filed complaint 
was dismissed without prejudice and that relator later acquires 
additional information sufficient to make a case. 
Interpreting the first-to-file bar as applying the same standard 
as Rule 9(b) would actually serve the purpose of judicial efficiency 
by adopting a standard that all district courts are familiar with. The 
standard in Rule 9(b) has been interpreted countless times since the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created in 1938.98 The Court in 
Batiste, however, created a vague new standard that is more likely to 
suffer from inconsistent interpretation from district court to district 
court. The standard requires a district court to predict when the 
Department of Justice will find information /1 sufficient" to "launch 
an investigation."99 Requiring multiple courts to predict the behavior 
of executive officers surely creates more uncertainty than requiring 
multiple district courts to apply a familiar standard from the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On balance, interpreting the first-to-file bar not to apply after a 
Rule 9(b) dismissal of an earlier suit generally either serves or does 
not offend the various specific policy goals of the first-to-file bar and 
False Claims Act generally. To the extent that these policy goals were 
articulated by Congress, it is appropriate for courts to consider these 
policy goals when attempting to resolve the circuit split. 
95 Batiste, 659 F .3d at 1210. 
96 31 u.s.c. § 3730(b)(5). 
97 Batiste, 659 F .3d at 1210. 
98 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HousE OF REPRESENTATIVE, FEDERAL RuLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, vii 
(historical note), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CV2009. 
pdf. Rule 9(b) has been applied so frequently that courts consider its contours well defined in a 
variety of highly specific contexts. See, e.g., Stevelman v. Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 
1999) (securities fraud). 
99 Batiste, 659 F .3d at 1210. 
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B. IMPACT OF THE FIRST-TO-FILE BAR ON THE POLICY GOALS 
OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AS A PRIVATE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL STATUTE 
1. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT RELATORS COMPARED TO 
OTHER PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
Which interpretation of the first-to-file bar is the better policy 
choice from a general perspective depends in part on whether private 
attorneys general provisions in general are typically beneficial or 
detrimental. However, the label "private attorney general" is applied 
in a wide variety of contexts. Because relators under the False Claims 
Act only represent the government when the government is acting in a 
relatively "private" role where it is contracting for services as a market 
participant, many of the policy critiques of private attorneys general 
apply with less force to False Claims Act relators. 
Professor Rubenstein has developed a taxonomy of the various roles 
labeled as "private attorneys general" which demonstrates how False 
Claims Act relators differ materially from other private attorneys general 
roles.100 Qui Tam relators under the False Claims Act "substitutes for 
the attorney general, but only in what is arguably the most 'private' of 
government functions: the recoupment of compensatory damages."101 
That is because the False Claims Act applies primarily in areas where 
the government acts like a private corporation, seeking compensatory 
damages rather than vindicating a public right, activity that the Supreme 
Court has labeled "market participation.102 This role is significantly 
different from the traditional definition of a private attorney general, 
who, according to Black's Law Dictionary, may recover attorneys' 
fees because she "brings a lawsuit that benefits a significant number 
of people, requires private enforcement, and is important to society 
as a whole."103 This definition envisions a situation where a fund that 
benefits a larger group is obtained through individual litigation and 
the plaintiff who acted as a private attorney general by bringing the 
case is awarded a fee from the fund on an unjust enrichment theory 
100 William B. Rubenstein, On What A "Private Attorney General" Is-and Why It Matters, 57 Vand. 
L. Rev. 2129 (2004). Rubenstein notes that private attorney general is an expansive term, and 
classifies different actors labeled as private attorneys general based on the three characteristics: 
the client (individual vs. collective), fee (contingent/hours vs. salary), and goal (compensation vs. 
deterrence). Rubenstein notes that each characteristic consists of a sliding scale, not black-and-
white alternatives. Id. at 2142. 
101 Id. at 2145. 
102 Id. at 2140-41. 
103 PRIVATE-ATTORNEY-GENERAL DOCTRINE, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
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to avoid free-riding.104 However, the False Claims Act relator's role -
essentially as a contractor of the attorney general - is quite different. 
In sum, the False Claims Act can be viewed as the United States 
hiring a group of private attorneys and investigators on a contingent-
fee basis to bring the same general type fraud cases that any private 
company may bring when it has been defrauded. It is therefore less 
problematic to evaluate the False Claims Act primarily in terms of 
economic efficiency, akin to normal government subcontracting, than 
other Private Attorney General statutes. However, some public policy 
concerns beyond those associated with routine types of subcontracting 
remain, primarily related to prosecutorial discretion. 
The False Claims Act provides transparency into government 
decisions to exercise prosecutorial discretion without eliminating that 
discretion. Critics of the False Claims Act claim that "private parties may 
be less sensitive than government agencies to the economic and social 
costs of particular enforcement actions."105 However, the False Claims 
Act does, in effect, provide for significant prosecutorial discretion. The 
Act provides that the government may dismiss or settle the action over 
the relator's objections after a hearing.106 Courts have interpreted this 
provision broadly, allowing dismissal for any government purpose 
that is not arbitrary or unlawful.107 Prosecutorial discretion is in effect 
only constrained by the political considerations involved in stating 
why the government would choose not to vigorously pursue a fraud 
claim and shifting the default rule from no suit without government 
action to allowing suit without government action. This salutary shift 
can provide greater deterrence as government contractors realize 
that fraud claims are more likely to be pursued and avoid either the 
perception or reality of under-enforcement against fraud for political 
reasons even while allowing for prosecutorial discretion where clearly 
necessary. Even some members of Congress have claimed that the 
Department of Justice is /1 on the side of the defense contractors,"108 
104 Rubenstein, supra note 109 at 2154. 
105 Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role 
of Administrative Agencies, 91 Va. L. Rev. 93, 115 (2005). 
106 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A). 
107 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co., 912 F. Supp. 
1325 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
108 False Claims Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 15 (1985) (statement of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum). See 
also, e.g., Charles E. Grassley, Op-Ed., Abe Lincoln vs. the Justice Department, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 
1993, at L21 ( "the Justice Department has been consistently hostile to whistleblowers" perhaps 
because "the executive branch dislikes citizens interfering in the cozy relationships it has with 
defense companies and other public contractors"); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the 
English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 539 (2000). 
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so the potential benefits to requiring transparency in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion may be large. 
2. SUITS FILED AFTER AN EARLIER RULE 9(B) DISMISSAL 
ARE PARTICULARLY LIKELY TO BENEFIT FROM THE 
INVOLVEMENT OF PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
Allowing the private market for legal services to determine whether 
to pursue cases where the government has already decided not to 
intervene in the earlier action presents the potential for substantial 
efficiency gains. Cases where an earlier action has already been 
dismissed are precisely where the screening function inherent in a 
market can provide the greatest benefit in allocating resources. 
The probability of a recovery by the plaintiff drops dramatically 
when the DOJ fails to intervene. One study found that plaintiffs 
recovered funds for the government in 90% of cases where the DOJ 
intervened compared to only 10% where the DOJ did not.109 Similar 
logic applies where the DOJ has declined to intervene in an earlier case. 
However, some relators and plaintiffs' attorneys are willing to litigate 
such presumably marginal cases. For example, the website of one such 
firm claims that "in some of our cases the United States Government 
has not intervened, but we have nonetheless pursued the defendants 
on behalf of our clients and the United States, settling many and seeing 
others through to jury verdict."110 
Empirical evidence indicates that firms specializing in Qui 
Tam litigation achieve higher recovery rates, 111 indicating that such 
experienced firms are adept at screening cases to determine if they 
are worth pursuing. Allowing the private market for legal services 
to determine whether such marginal cases are worth pursuing, while 
shifting the risk of allocating too many resources to marginal claims 
away from the United States through a contingent fee structure, has 
obvious benefits. Therefore, interpreting the first-to-file bar to allow 
a subsequent relator to proceed when an earlier suit was dismissed 
under Rule 9(b) is particularly unlikely to result in suits where the DOJ 
would likely would have achieved the same result on its own at lower 
cost. On the contrary, this interpretation of the first-to-file bar would 
allow the United States to realize greater benefits from actions by Qui 
Tam relators acting as private attorneys general. 
109 Engstrom, supra note 2, at n. 24. 
110 About Our Practice, HELMER, MARTINS, RrCE & POPHAM Co., L.P.A., http://www.fcalawfirm.com/ 
fcalawsite/practice/index.html (last visited April 16, 2013) 
111 Engstrom, supra note 2, at 18. 
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IV. CoNCL us IONS 
Interpreting the first-to-file bar not to apply after an earlier suit 
is dismissed under Rule 9(b) is thus more consistent with the text 
and purpose of the False Claims Act than competing interpretations. 
However, it is not clear that the existing first-to-file bar, under either 
interpretation, represents optimal policy. This Note discussed the 
statutory interpretation and policy concerns related to the first-to-file 
bar as written. However, the same policy analysis applies equally to 
potential revision of the first-to-file bar by Congress. The implications 
of the above analysis on potential reforms of the first-to-file bar, 
discussed briefly below, provide interesting topics for potential future 
investigation. 
Other aspects of the False Claims Act have been successfully 
reformed to allow an expanded role for private attorneys general 
while maintaining government control where necessary. For example, 
the public disclosure bar was recently reformed as part of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.112 The changes broaden the /1 original 
source" exception to the bar and otherwise allow more suits to proceed: 
relators with "knowledge that is independent of and materially adds 
to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions" now qualify as 
original sources, only federal - not state - proceedings now count as 
public disclosures, and suits may not be dismissed under the public 
disclosure bar if the government opposes dismissal.113 The inclusion of 
these reforms in health care legislation suggests Congressional opinion 
that the False Claims Act has been effective and that strengthening 
the False Claims Act will be particularly useful in the context of the 
healthcare. This is unsurprising given that more than half of Qui Tam 
actions filed under the False Claims Act have related to healthcare, 
recovering nearly $10 billion.114 The principles behind these reforms 
can be applied to the first-to-file bar. 
The first-to-file bar could be modified to provide a relator some 
reward for useful information even when the relator is not the first to 
bring suit. Just as a court may determine whether new information 
"materially adds" to the case under the public disclosure bar, courts 
could be asked to make a similar determination under a revised first-to-
file bar. The court is already charged with assessing the efficacy of the 
relators involvement in determining the relator's share of a recovery, 115 
112 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
113 Id. 
114 See S. Comm. on the Judiciary, False Claims Act Correction Act of 2008, S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 
8 (2008). 
115 The court already has discretion to decrease a relator's share by up to 40% where the court 
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so making a similar determination among multiple relators should be 
feasible, and likely no more difficult than current determination required 
to interpret whether the first-to-file bar applies. 
Congress could change who must oppose the later-filed suit to have 
it dismissed under the first-to-file bar. If the purpose of the first-to-file 
bar is to protect the relator in the earlier suit from additional parasitic 
suits, then a subsequent suit should be allowed to proceed unless the 
relator in the earlier suit objects. In the vast majority of cases, a relator in 
a suit where the government has declined to intervene and the court has 
dismissed the suit for failing to satisfy Rule 9(b) may see her prospects 
for success as dim, and not object if another relator with additional 
information wishes to bring suit.116 Where the first-to-file bar protects 
defendants, not an earlier relator, it does not serve the purpose of the 
Act. An alternative rule could allow the government to be the decision-
maker, either allowing the suit to proceed unless the government objects, 
or preventing the suit from being dismissed under the first-to-file bar if 
the government objects, as in the reformed public disclosure bar. 
Even more far-reaching reform might consider separating the 
whistleblower incentives and the legal services incentives in the False 
Claims Act. As currently structured, the Act explicitly provides an 
incentive for whistleblowers, who then choose an attorney to provide 
the legal services necessary to file a claim. However, a whistleblower is 
unlikely to be the party best positioned to choose competent counsel for 
the United States at the right price. 
Disaggregating incentives for information about fraud and private 
provision of legal services to bring suit to recover the fraudulent 
payment could help resolve this difficulty. For example, after relators 
have brought forward information about a fraud, the plaintiffs' attorney 
could be chosen using a class-action based model where the court picks 
the attorney best able to bring the suit from multiple applicants based on 
factors such as experience in similar actions or cost to the government 
to bring the suit.117 The Court could then equitably consider the value of 
the information supplied by each relator and the degree of legal work 
believes the relators contributions where small. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). 
116 Such a rule would raise interesting questions about the mechanics of preclusion in Qui Tam 
suits that are beyond the scope of this discussion. For a discussion of preclusion in Qui Tam 
actions under the False Claims Act see Nathan D. Sturycz, The King and I?: An Examination of the 
Interest Qui Tam Relators Represent and the Implications for Future False Claims Act Litigation, 28 St. 
Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 459 (2009). 
117 Compare to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) (requiring consideration of factors including "the work 
counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims," experience in handling similar 
cases, "resources that counsel will commit" to the case, and any other factors the court finds 
appropriate). 
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required in approving a portion of the award to various relators and 
plaintiffs' attorneys. However, in considering such potential reforms, 
Congress would have to balance the possibility that the increased 
complexity associated with such a system might not be worth the 
efficiency gains. 
The history of the False Claims Act shows that Congress has 
actively updated the False Claims Act, including passing legislation 
that specifically responds to decisions that Congress disagrees with, so 
Congressional reform to clarify or improve the first-to-file bar may be a 
realistic possibility. Senator Grassley is a particularly strong supporter of 
a broad role for private attorneys general under the False Claims Act. His 
website states that "there are constant threats to the strength of the False 
Claims Act and its qui tam provision" but "I will stay vigilant in working 
to protect this proven anti-fraud law from efforts to weaken or even gut 
it."118 Senator Grassley was a sponsor of the Fraud Enforcement And 
Recovery Act of 2009 that was intended in part to "correct erroneous 
interpretations of the [False Claims Act] that were decided in Allison 
Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders."119 The bill passed the Senate on 
a vote of 94 to 4 the House on a vote 338 to 52, indicating broad bipartisan 
support for the measures to strengthen the False Claims Act.120 The 
False Claims Act was further strengthened in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010.121 These amendments show that legislators 
in both parties have supported strengthening the qui tam provisions in 
the False Claims Act and have actively addressed court decisions that 
run counter to their desired interpretation of the Act, so a legislative 
response to either Batiste itself or a potential Supreme Court decision 
endorsing Batiste may be a realistic possibility. 
Nevertheless, Congressional action can still be difficult and time 
consuming. Action by the Court to clarify that the first-to-file bar should 
not to apply after an earlier suit is dismissed under 9(b) would be 
more efficient than Congressional action reversing such a decision. In 
addition, interpreting the first-to-file bar not to apply after an earlier suit 
is dismissed under 9(b) would both be more consistent the text of the 
statute and recent pleadings developments and improve the effectiveness 
of the False Claims Act at combatting fraud. 
118 These statements appear on Senator Grassley's official website. Q&A ON THE FALSE CLAIMS 
ACT AT 25 YEARS AND $30 BILLION IN RECOVERIES, http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/ 
Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_l502=38787 (last visited May 27, 2013). 
119 S. Rep. No. 10, S. REP. 111-10, 10, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 430, 438. 
120 See S. 386 (lllth): FERA, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/lll/s386 (last visited May 26, 
2013). 
121 PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, PL 111-148, March 23, 2010, 124 
Stat 119. 
